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Climate Change, Population, and Justice:  
Hard choices to avoid tragic choices  
 
Elizabeth Cripps 
 
Introduction 
 
Let us begin with a minimal understanding of global and intergenerational 
justice. I take the former as requiring that no-one in current generations is 
avoidably unable to live a decent human life: one with a secure opportunity to 
satisfy central human interests. The latter I take as requiring that future 
generations are left also with the opportunity for decent lives. These are very 
limited accounts but with significant implications. One is that doing 
intergenerational justice requires acting effectively on global climate change, 
including mitigation, in order to leave future generations able to live decent lives. 
This is so well established that I will take it as a starting assumption.1  
Given this, we face a danger: within a few generations, basic global justice and 
intergenerational justice could become incompatible if the human population 
grows fast enough.2 Future generations would be outside the circumstances of 
even basic justice. It would be unable to feed and shelter everyone, and 
otherwise protect basic needs, except by denying its successors the resources to 
feed and shelter themselves and/or exposing them to the serious health and 
other costs of global climate change. The choice faced by such a generation 
                                                        
1 E.g. IPCC (2014) p. 13-16, 17.  
2 Wissenburg (1998) p. 80-81, Cafaro (2012) p. 55, Cripps (Forthcoming), Robeyns 
(Unpublished-b).  
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would be ‘tragic’, by which I mean that whatever decision is made, it would have 
morally terrible ramifications.3 It would conflict with even the most basic 
considerations of what we owe one another as human beings. 
This paper asks two questions. Do current generations also face a tragic 
choice, because there is no way to avoid bequeathing this legacy without 
adopting population policies which are themselves morally terrible? And if there 
is such a way, can we do so without making morally ‘hard’ policy choices?  
By morally hard choices I mean those where something must be done against 
which there are generally strong moral reasons, although the truly terrible 
alternatives of tragic choices can be avoided. At the individual level, a choice 
between killing one innocent person and another would be tragic. A choice 
between lying to one person and breaking a promise to another would be 
morally hard. So too would be that between killing one person and breaking a 
promise to another. This latter is ‘hard’ not in the sense that there is no clear 
right way to act but because even the less awful alternative involves a line of 
conduct against which, other things being equal, there is a strong moral 
presumption. 
In the current context, consider the following alternatives: violating basic 
human rights; demanding unbearable sacrifices of the badly off; failing to secure 
basic interests or rights for some children; extreme interference with the family, 
to the extent of removing children from otherwise adequate parents; reducing 
the starting position of some children relative to others (a form of institutional 
unfairness); or mild to moderate interference with the family. The first four are 
                                                        
3 Gardiner (2010) p. 300-302.  
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so terrible that any choice between them would be tragic. The last two are 
morally hard options.  
I will argue that, beyond such choice-providing measures as are already 
required by basic global justice, collective action to curb population growth 
necessitates taking one or more of these options. However, there is reason to 
hope that the tragic legacy can be avoided without resorting to the first four 
alternatives. Or so the first part of this paper will maintain. 
The second part will argue that hard choices are unavoidable. An apparent 
way out turns out itself to be another hard option. This would be to rely on 
prompt action on global injustice and climate change, combined with 
technological innovation, to avoid the tragic legacy without further, incentive-
changing population policies. However, there is a presumption against taking a 
collective gamble with such morally desperate stakes. Moreover, it involves 
another form of institutional unfairness: collectively imposing increased burdens 
on some adults as a result of the choices of others.  
 
Avoiding tragic choices 
 
Let us begin with the claim that we risk bequeathing a tragic legacy. To do basic 
intergenerational justice, greenhouse gas emissions must be curbed, natural 
resources preserved, and adaptation mechanisms developed, until future 
generations are left with the opportunity for a universal decent human life. To 
achieve basic global justice, this must be done without leaving anyone in this 
generation avoidably without this opportunity. The larger the human population, 
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the more challenging this two-fold task. Ultimately, the two ends could become 
incompatible.4  
This is no merely hypothetical worry. World population, 7.2bn in 2014, is 
predicted to grow as shown in Table 1, and considered unlikely to stabilise 
before 2100.5 
 
Table 1: United Nations World Population Predictions6 
  2050 
(low)  
2050 
(med.)  
2050 
(high)  
2050 
(cons. 
fert.)  
2100 
(low)  
2100 
(med.)  
2100 
(high)  
2100 
(cons. 
fert.)  
Predicted 
world 
population 
(millions)  
8342 9551 10868 11089 6750 10854 16641 28646 
Assumed 
fertility 
(2045-50 & 
2095-2100)  
1.78 2.24 2.71 3.28 1.51 1.99 2.47 4.61 
 
Not only are current resource use and emissions unsustainable (globally, we use 
the equivalent of 1.5 planets annually year7) but the more people there are, the 
lower we must go on the development scale to find a country whose average 
lifestyle would be globally sustainable. For the 2010 world population (6.9bn), 
this occurs at roughly the development level of Ghana, 138th on the Human 
Development Index.8 This is less than our current population, well below even 
the lowest variant UN forecast for 2050, and less than half the high forecast for 
2100. 
                                                        
4 There is a distinction between constraining population to maintain the circumstances of basic 
justice, and seeking an ‘optimal’ population in terms of a higher standard of human life and/or 
protecting non-humans. This paper focuses on the former. 
5 Gerland et al. (2014) p. 234.  
6 UN DESA (2013) p. 2, 12. 
7 McLellan et al. (2014) p. 32. 
8 McLellan et al. (2014) p. 38-39, UN Development Programme (2014a). 
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Before asking whether this already imposes a tragic choice, I must clarify an 
important point. Understandable objections are made to any attempt by western 
environmentalists to focus on global population growth, which is driven more by 
the developing world, rather than on per capita emissions levels in the west, 
historically responsible for very great environmental damage.9 This paper fully 
recognises this. Far from addressing population in isolation, it starts with the 
central importance of effective global action to secure basic global justice, 
mitigate climate change, and preserve natural resources. Thus, it advocates from 
the outset policies to improve the condition of the vulnerable through transfers 
from and lifestyle changes by the global affluent.  
However, this very starting point means that our concern must be with overall 
population growth. If the lifestyles of the increasingly numerous global poor 
must be improved, the environmental impact of any such improvement cannot 
be ignored. To assume that they are entitled to a decent life is to assume that 
their numbers matter too.10 
 
Tragic scenario 1: coercion as already necessary 
Policies to slow birth rates fall into three categories.11 Choice-providing 
measures, though describable as population policies, are not exclusively such but 
are required for basic (especially gender) justice. They include provision of 
                                                        
9 See Gardiner’s critique of Hardin. (Hardin (1968) p., Gardiner (2001) p., Gardiner (2011) p. 
433-454.) 
10 Cafaro (2012) p. 53-55, Cripps (Forthcoming). 
11 Cripps (Forthcoming). I am taking it as straightforwardly impermissible to address population 
size by causing people to live less long. Another alternative is to exploit the link between parental 
age and population size. This deserves consideration, but I hesitate to rely on it. Parental age 
already increases with development, education and empowerment of women. Beyond the 
existing norm in developed countries, asking it might be asking an unacceptable sacrifice. Despite 
medical advances, women who delay childbearing well into their 30s run a significantly 
increased risk of infertility.  
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contraception, education and opportunities for women, and basic security. 
Incentive-changing policies range from the soft (educational and social 
campaigns; positive financial or economic incentives) to the hard (restriction of 
current policies, such as child allowances or tax credits, which spread child-
rearing costs; negative incentives such as fines).12 Directly coercive policies 
forcibly interfere with couples or individuals to prevent them having (live) 
children. They involve infanticide, forced abortion or sterilisation, or otherwise 
preventing unprotected sexual intercourse (or otherwise conceiving a child).  
If directly coercive policies were the only way to avoid bequeathing the tragic 
legacy, current generations would face a tragic choice.13 Such policies violate 
basic human rights to bodily integrity or privacy. They are morally unthinkable.  
However, for this to be the case, the two other sets of population policy would 
have to be known to be ineffective or impossible. In fact, there is space – and 
hope – for both. Rather than invariably reflecting individual preferences, family 
sizes often result from lack of contraception, or of the education and 
empowerment needed for informed, free procreative choices.14 Even where 
parenting results from such choices, incentive-changing policies, which seek to 
change individual’s preferences or the way they regard the situation, lie between 
a collective action problem of this kind and the necessity of coercion.15  
                                                        
12 Cafaro (2012) p. 47. 
13 E.g. Hardin (1968).  
14 UN DESA (2013) p. xvii. 
15 Gardiner (2011) p. 446-8. Another case against coercion is that it has been questioned whether 
forcible measures are more effective, in terms of establishing self-maintaining long-term lower 
fertility trends, than a combination of empowerment, education, and financial incentives. (E.g. 
Sen (1996). However, his reliance on a particular case study has been questioned. (Kates (2004) 
p. 66-68.)) 
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Moreover, the situation is one of uncertainty.16 The UN figures demonstrate 
the difference made even by a 0.5 children/women change in average fertility. 
Further uncertainty surrounds the exact impact on birth rates of effective action 
on basic global justice. Given this, the moral presumption must be against 
leaping to the worst case interpretation, if that means doing what would 
otherwise be impermissible. Another way of putting the central dilemma of this 
paper is as follows: how not to leave future generations undoubtedly facing a 
choice between coercion and leaving the circumstances of basic global and 
intergenerational justice.17 But that ‘undoubtedly’ does not yet apply. Being in a 
situation which might turn into a tragic choice scenario does not justify acting as 
though we were already there.18 (The precautionary principle, to which I will 
later appeal, loses its plausibility when the precautionary measure is morally 
terrible.)  
 
Tragic scenario 2: human right to decide family size 
On another line of thinking, we already face a tragic choice because even 
incentive-changing population policies violate an absolute, unlimited basic right 
to decide family size.19 Such a right, on some viewpoints, is grounded in a central 
human interest and violated by any collective interference.20  
                                                        
16 Albeit less so than previously thought, however: according to Gerland et al. (2014) p. 234., a 
2100 population of 9.6-12.3bn is 80 per cent likely.  
17 Cafaro (2012) p. 51, Cripps (Forthcoming). By ‘circumstances of justice’ I mean, 
uncontroversially, those in which it is both possible for some institutional scheme to secure for 
all the opportunity for a decent life, and necessary (given the limits of individual altruism) to 
have such a scheme in order to do so.  
18 Heyward (2012) p. 727. 
19 Note that choice-providing policies not only would not violate but are a necessary part of 
fulfilling any such right. Plausibly construed it would, of course, have to include the right to 
decide not to have (more) children. 
20 One reading of the UN position. (UN Population Information Network (1994) p. 7.3.)  
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This can be forestalled. Even if the opportunity to parent were a central 
human interest, it need not follow that there is such an interest in having as 
many children as desired. Rather, a persuasive view has been defended between 
this extreme and the opposite one on which the decision to parent at all is just 
another lifestyle choice.21 On this intermediate view, a genuine, secure 
opportunity to have and rear at least one child is necessary for a decent human 
life.22 This might be defended in different ways: as the opportunity to enjoy a 
unique relationship, and/or pass something of oneself on after death.23 However, 
this desire to procreate or parent becomes less of a need beyond one child, and 
increasingly ‘want-like’ as the number of children increases.24  
The claim is not that further children do not add huge value to parents’ lives, 
or that parents do not strongly desire them. (Witness the health risks many 
women are prepared to take.) Nor is it the case that they are not reasonably 
wanted on other grounds, such as giving an existing child a sibling. However, 
other activities add huge value to the lives of other persons; who is to say they 
don’t add as much? These parents already have an opportunity to experience any 
unique goods of parenting. It is not clear why the ambition to go on doing so with 
more and more children should be treated differently from other ambitions, such 
as that to climb ever more mountains.25  
This paper is compatible with a fundamental interest in the opportunity to 
parent. Indeed, the tragic legacy can be reformulated in these terms: a generation 
                                                        
21 E.g. Conly (2005), Overall (2012) p. 19-33, 180-84, Gheaus (Unpublished), Robeyns 
(Unpublished-a). For the other extreme view, see Young (2001). 
22 I will not discuss whether this interest can only satisfied by parenting one’s own biological 
offspring. In order to be adopted, children have to come into the world.  
23 E.g. Dyck (1973) p. 74-76, Robertson (1994) p. 24, Brighouse and Swift (2006) p. 91-101. 
24 Terminology from Robeyns (Unpublished-a). See also Conly (2005) p. 107. 
25 Analogy adapted from Bou-Habib and Olsaretti (2013) p. 432.  
 9 
unable to hand on the conditions for a decent human life would have either to 
sacrifice its children’s prospects, or refrain from having them, i.e. sacrifice this 
interest.26 
Equally, however, I do not assume such a central human interest. For those 
unconvinced by the unique value of the parent-child relationship, it is necessary 
only to accept that basic justice guarantees everyone some opportunity to 
develop and live by her conception of the good or plan of life, and that parenting 
is, for very many, integral to that.27 This makes the case for protecting the 
opportunity.  
It does not, however, imply that scope to parent more and more children 
should be ring-fenced.28 There is a distinction between being enabled to pursue 
one’s conception of the good or plan of life at all, and being enabled to make 
unlimited socially or intergenerationally expensive decisions about how 
extensively to do so. Again, if those who choose to parent must be allowed or 
enabled to have six children, why shouldn’t our mountaineer be allowed or 
enabled to climb all the world’s mountains? He might consider his life every bit 
as blighted if he cannot. But, of course, no collective scheme can do this for all 
conceptions of the good. 
Perhaps this is supposed to be a special case because large families are often 
part of religious or cultural conceptions of the good. However, it is has yet to be 
shown why such views should ‘trump’ the equally strongly held convictions of 
others. Rather, given different conceptions of the good, their adherents – 
                                                        
26 Gheaus (Unpublished), Wissenburg (2010).  
27 For a Rawlsian version of this argument, see Bou-Habib and Olsaretti (2013) p. 432-3. This is 
presented as a case for state support for parents, but it is unclear that this would justify 
additional support as the number of children increased. 
28 As Heyward suggests. ((2012) p. 719.) 
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including the religious – must be reasonable in meeting others on common 
ground when it comes to what is to be guaranteed as a matter of justice. 
Thus, this tragic construal of our situation is based on an illusion. We need not 
assume an all-trumping, interest-based right in choosing family size which 
renders impermissible any collective action to influence procreative behaviour. 
However, a constraint has been introduced. Incentive-changing population 
policies can stay on the table, but only once the opportunity to parent at all has 
been secured.  
I leave it open exactly where the line lies between ‘need’ and ‘want’ (or 
‘fundamental interest’ and ‘interest’). The discussion above suggests that it could 
be drawn after one child, or – more plausibly – that there is a gradual transition 
thereafter.29 If the latter, the appropriate policies would provide increased 
incentives to refrain from further procreation as the number of children 
increased. 
 
Tragic scenario 3: asking unbearable sacrifice 
Although an interest-based basic right to decide family size has been dismissed, 
there remain circumstances under which large families count as a need, because 
other fundamental interests depend on them. For women with no other 
opportunities, this may be the only route to social regard. For couples unable to 
protect their basic needs in old age, many children may be the closest they can 
get to long-term security, especially where infant mortality is high.30 Note also 
                                                        
29 Overall upholds a basic right to two children per couple. (Overall (2012) p. 180-4.) This is 
convenient for those of us with two children, but I find her defence unconvincing. It is not clear 
why each parent needs to replace herself in numerical terms. 
30 Gerwith (1979) p. 152, Carter (2004) p. 354, Cripps (Forthcoming). 
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that the opportunity to parent would be inadequately secured by being able to 
have one or two children, if they were unlikely to survive.  
Under such circumstances, policies incentivising reduced birth rates could 
demand unacceptable – because unbearable – sacrifices of those already very 
badly off. Of course, nuanced incentive-changing schemes would change 
precisely these pay-offs, but the danger would then be of effectively coercing 
women or couples into procreative restraint.31 Moreover, too blunt-headed an 
economic scheme, operating against a background in which women lack 
empowerment, could demand just such sacrifices of them, for example by 
inducing husbands to make decisions without consulting them.  
Thus, incentive-changing population policies count as non-terrible options 
only where sufficient choice-providing policies are in place. This need not put 
this generation as a whole in a tragic choice situation – for many, basic needs do 
not depend upon having a large family – but it has important implications.  
It rules out immediately introducing incentive-changing policies in some 
developing countries (except among the affluent minority). Given that it is in just 
such countries that populations are growing fastest,32 this is another case for 
urgency in enabling and incentivising developing states to introduce choice-
providing measures. It could also put pressure on more developed states, even 
those with falling birth rates, to exploit incentive-based means of reducing them 
more rapidly. This might be necessary (alongside redistribution, and emissions 
reductions) to accommodate some of the growth elsewhere. 
 
                                                        
31 Sen (1996) p. 1059. 
32 UN DESA (2013) p. xvi. 
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Tragic scenario 4: basic injustice to children v. extreme interference with 
families 
Recall the four categories of incentive-changing population policy. One includes 
negative economic incentives. Another limits to first children, or progressively 
reduces after them, the measures in place in many states for relieving parents of 
parenting costs. These range from child allowances to free education. A third 
includes positive economic incentives for procreative restraint. A fourth uses 
education, campaigning and other measures to cultivate a norm of small families, 
with associated social approval or disapproval. The latter two might be termed 
‘soft’ incentive-changing policies. Although any effective overall scheme would 
need global reach, I will assume this is done via individual states.  
We have seen that incentive-based interference need not violate a human 
right or (invariably) impose an unbearable sacrifice. However, this generation 
would face a tragic choice if all available options were to turn out to be morally 
terrible on other grounds, as directly coercive policies are.33 The danger is that 
incentive-changing policies force a tragic choice between basic injustice to 
children and extreme interference with the family.  
This arises from one salient circumstance: children are generally brought up 
by their parents. Their prospects and opportunities depend on the educational 
support, lifestyle, nutrition, and emotional grounding that those parents can give 
them.34 Thus, the first two policy measures, above, would undermine some 
parents’ ability to secure their children’s basic needs if they were consistently 
applied to those who had large families despite them. But it is incompatible with 
                                                        
33 O'Neill (1979) p. 35. 
34 E.g. Dyck (1973) p. 78, Bayles (1975) p. 50.  
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basic justice for an institutional scheme to deprive children of central interests. 
Regardless of how many siblings they have, all children have the same basic 
moral entitlements.  
Guarding against this would require changing the way in which children’s 
central interests are provided for: i.e. interfering with the family. The danger is 
that it would require doing so to an extreme degree. Removing children from 
otherwise adequate parents not only means being prepared entirely to 
undermine the integrity of the family – an institution widely taken to have great 
value in itself35 – but plausibly violates a basic right of parents, especially 
mothers, who have been through pregnancy and birth.36 Thus, it represents a 
moral roadblock even assuming (which is by no means certain) that significant 
cost to the children could be avoided by transferring them to ‘equally good’ 
parents. 
Nor are these concerns limited to the first two policy types. Consider 
educational and other promotion of procreative restraint.37 If parents of 
‘additional’ children are being told, in effect, that they should not have had them, 
the danger is that these children will be considered – and consider themselves – 
second class citizens. Assuming (reasonably) that a meaningful opportunity for 
self-respect is a central human interest,38 a policy which made this impossible 
for some would be incompatible with basic justice. 
These concerns draw on a very real tension. I will later argue that 
implementing incentive-changing population policies means making hard moral 
                                                        
35 E.g. Schoeman (1980) p., Macleod (2002) p. 213-217, Munoz-Darde (2002) p. 268.  
36 Gheaus (2012). 
37 Heyward (2012) p. 717-18.  
38 Rawls (1971) p. 386-391. 
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choices. However, they are insufficient to demonstrate that we already face a 
tragic choice.  
Negative incentives might be introduced, and changes made to existing cost-
sharing mechanisms, in a nuanced manner. Some services might be provided 
directly to children, while costs are reaped back (perhaps later) from parents. 
(E.g. through state education, nursery care, and health care, after-school reading 
clubs, free meals in schools and nurseries, combined with an increasing tax on 
parents with more than one child.)  
Ultimately, of course, unless all provision for some children is removed from 
some parents, there will be some number of children per family at which it is 
impossible both to protect their basic needs and apply such policies. However, 
the extent to which this is a real danger depends on how far potential parents 
would fail to be motivated by such policies, and so on empirical work beyond this 
paper.39 It must be left, then, as a theoretical risk which, if it turned out to be 
practically significant, would impose limits on the first two incentive-changing or 
internalisation policies, possibly ruling them out altogether.  
 Similarly with educational or cultural measures, the theoretical danger of 
undermining a central interest must be acknowledged, contingent on detailed 
empirical studies. However, this does not justify automatically discounting all 
such measures as impermissible. Rather, the onus would be on those introducing 
them to combine the message of procreative restraint with emphasis on the 
equal moral status of all children.  
                                                        
39 One early survey was inconclusive but found some evidence of behavioural change. (Berelson 
(1974) p. 5-6.), However, reliance on existing research is complicated by the fact that incentives 
have sometimes been introduced without the choice-providing background.  
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The point is not that some particular third, fourth, or tenth child ‘should not’ 
have existed. It is that, overall, families should be smaller. The distinction is 
important: compare parents of many with a mother who predictably, seriously 
damages her health (and so, indirectly, the lives of her existing children) to have 
another baby. One might say that she was irresponsible, even wrong, without 
implying that it is a bad thing that that new person, with its unique traits and 
potential, was brought into the world, and certainly without suggesting that that 
child is entitled to less consideration than anyone else. Nor need this one social 
norm dominate psychological development. Indeed, the knowledge that their 
parents must have wanted them very much, to act thus contrary to society, 
would itself be one factor in building self esteem.  
Moreover, none of these concerns have counted against the third possibility 
identified above: small positive economic incentives for procreative restraint, 
against a background of basic justice and adequate opportunity for all children.  
 
Making hard choices 
 
I have found reason to hope that, in our current generation, we could avoid 
bequeathing a tragic choice without taking morally terrible options on 
population policy. This is so even if we must go beyond choice-providing to some 
incentive-changing population policies. The remainder of this paper will argue 
that, nonetheless, we face morally hard choices. One apparent way out – 
assuming that population growth will fall sufficiently without incentive-changing 
measures – turns out itself to represent a morally hard choice. And incentive-
changing policies force morally hard choices of their own. 
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Hard option 1: the technological gamble 
Perhaps this paper has been too pessimistic in characterising current 
generations’ predicament. On a more optimistic view, there is no need for hard, 
let alone tragic, choices about population policy so long as we do the right thing 
now in terms of tackling climate change, natural resource depletion, and global 
injustice. Fertility rates fall with development40 and as a result of those choice-
providing measures which form part of basic justice: contraception, education 
and opportunities for women, and basic security. If we could rely on their falling 
enough, there would be no need for incentive-changing policies. 
The suggestion is not that doing global basic justice alone could avoid 
bequeathing the tragic choice – quite the reverse, since development increases 
per capita environmental impact – but that it could do so in conjunction with 
concerted action to mitigate that impact. In other words, given a wholehearted 
combination of emissions cuts with global redistribution, women’s education 
and empowerment (including contraceptive availability), population would 
stabilise soon enough and at a low enough level to keep our children and 
grandchildren within the circumstances of basic global and intergenerational 
justice.  
Moreover, impact on the environment results from a combination of three 
factors: population size, affluence (or consumption) and technology (or the 
limitations thereof).41 A modified version of the optimistic view emphasises this 
last factor, arguing that even if immediate action on basic global justice and 
                                                        
40 UN DESA (2011) p. 12. 
41 The IPAT equation. (Ehrlich and Holdren (1972) p. 20.) 
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climate change could not reduce population growth sufficiently to prevent the 
tragic legacy, further investment in technology could render any remaining 
population growth sustainable.42 The point, again, would be that we needn’t 
consider incentive-changing population policies. 
These views make crucial points whether or not the apparent ‘ways out’ are 
viable. The ‘population factor’ – the prospect of bequeathing a tragic choice – is  
yet another case for urgent collective action to combat basic global injustice and 
climate change.43 Moreover, the force of choice-providing policies must not be 
underestimated. The UN predictions, acknowledgedly, might need reducing if 
there were a massive upscale to 120m new users of family planning services by 
2020.44 Equally of course, technological investment, funded by the global 
affluent, is essential. This is particularly so if, as suggested, incentive-based 
population policies cannot immediately permissibly be introduced in parts of the 
developing world.  
However, accepting either optimistic view involves taking a gamble: one with 
the morally terrible at stake. This, I suggest, renders it unjustifiable to rely on the 
original optimistic view, and makes relying on the modified one a morally hard 
option. 
Begin with the claim that prompt action on global and climate justice will be 
sufficient to avoid bequeathing a tragic legacy, in themselves and because they 
reduce population growth. This is highly doubtful. Significant progress in choice-
providing terms is already built into the UN forecasts.45 The challenge, moreover, 
is to secure enough development not only to do basic global justice and reverse 
                                                        
42 Heyward (2012) p. 722-723. 
43 Cripps (Forthcoming).  
44 UN DESA (2013) p. 31. 
45 UN DESA (2013) p. xvii, Robeyns (Unpublished-b). See also Table 1. 
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population growth – quickly – but to do so whilst acting on climate change and 
natural resource preservation. Recall that the crossover point for non-
sustainability, even for 6.9bn people, is at around the Ghanaian development 
level: a country with 18.7 per cent of its population near multidimensional 
poverty, 12.1 per cent in severe poverty, and a 2013 fertility rate of 3.9 children 
per women.46 
There is also the time factor. Every year of business as usual, with increasing 
impact from population growth and emissions, reduces the available per capita 
ecological footprint. Nor can moves towards basic global justice, including 
choice-providing policies, take effect overnight. (2020 is only five years away.) 
Kerala, the Indian case study held up as an exemplar of the effectiveness of 
empowerment and education, may be a special case, primed by generations of 
cultural change.47 
My claim is not that such measures could not suffice. It is that precautionary 
considerations pull strongly against relying on their so doing. Borrowing an 
argument from the general climate justice debate, a precautionary approach can 
be appropriate where exact risk levels are unknown, so long as three conditions 
are met: some outcome would be terrible; the mechanism which would bring it 
about is understood and the conditions for its functioning are accumulating; and 
the costs of avoidance are comparatively non-excessive.48 The first two 
conditions are met here, motivating at least a thorough attempt to satisfy the 
third. In other words, it would be unjustifiable to take this gamble without 
seriously considering any non-tragic alternatives. (Note the contrast with earlier 
                                                        
46 UN Development Programme (2014b), World Bank (2014). 
47 Kates (2004) p. 66-68. 
48 Shue (2010) p. 147-8.  
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in the paper, where I denied that the risk of already being in a tragic situation 
could justify acting as though we undoubtedly were and moving straight to the 
morally impermissible: coercion. As a ‘cost of avoidance’, this would not be 
comparatively non-excessive.) 
Consider now the view on which technological progress could accommodate 
any population growth not prevented by a move towards basic justice. Clearly, 
technological investment would be one non-tragic option. It makes bequeathing 
a tragic choice less likely, at the non-excessive cost of demanding more, 
financially, of the global affluent. The modified, technological, gamble is thus 
better than relying on the original optimistic view. However, the decision to do 
only this, rather than also use incentive-changing population policies, would 
itself be a morally hard choice. 
This is partly because it still is a gamble. Technology is not some ‘get out of jail 
free’ card. Considerable investment is essential already: new and up-scaled 
adaptation and renewable energy technology are essential to tackling climate 
change and global injustice. This itself is reason for caution about relying on 
future innovations also to accommodate population growth. Moreover, if, as 
reported, it would take 1.3 planets to feed 9.2bn people with a low carbon 
footprint and the comparatively non-excessive diet of the average Malaysian,49 a 
‘green technology’ revolution could be insufficient. Technology would also be 
needed massively to improve food productivity.  
Again, we cannot rely on this happening in time. Technological development is 
uncertain, and has not made much headway even with mitigating climate 
                                                        
49 Pollard et al. (2010) p. 86, Cripps (Forthcoming). (Malaysia is 62nd on the Human Development 
Index (UN Development Programme (2014a)).) 
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change.50 Previous technological revolutions took 70-100 years to be realised; 
this one would have 40, at most.51  
Thus, while there is a clear case for additional technological investment, 
alongside immediate action to tackle global injustice and climate change, relying 
on it should be weighed as another non-ideal option in a hard choice situation, 
against any other non-tragic alternatives.  
 
Hard option 2: institutional unfairness across adults 
There is another way in which this technological gamble is a morally hard 
option: it involves implicitly accepting institutional unfairness. 
Suppose we were, collectively, to tackle climate change and basic global 
injustice. This would require some enforceable institutional scheme, ultimately 
global but in practice almost certainly implemented through states. For the sake 
of argument, suppose also – contrary to the section above – that such a scheme, 
with additional technological investment, would limit population growth enough 
to avoid the tragic legacy. 
Even within these limits, population size would matter. The cost of any such 
global scheme varies with population size: the more people there are, the more 
expensive it is to provide for them without jeopardising future generations. 
What this total number is depends on how many new persons come into being. 
New persons come into being because their parents cause them to exist.52 Many 
of those parents choose freely and knowingly to do so (or at least foreseeably to 
                                                        
50 Renewables accounted for 8.5 per cent of global electricity in 2013. (Frankfurt School-UNEP 
Centre/BNEF (2014) p. 11-12.) 
51 UN DESA (2011) p. x-xiv. 
52 Wissenburg (2010).  
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risk so doing).53 Thus, this scheme would impose increased per capita burdens 
on all as a result of the unconstrained choices of only some individuals or 
subgroups. (I will refer to this increased burden as the environmental and basic 
justice cost of additional persons.)  
This may not conflict with basic global justice. However, it is contrary to the 
stronger, more egalitarian views that many have about the requirements of 
distributive justice: views on which an individual’s opportunities or burdens, 
even above the level of basic justice, should be luck-insensitive but choice-
sensitive. Thus, at the very least, there is a problem of institutional unfairness 
when a mutually coercive collective institution not only fails to correct uneven, 
luck-sensitive burden allocations, but actively imposes them. 
This implication reinforces the claim that the technological gamble, far from 
being a straightforward way out of our collective predicament, is one morally 
problematic option among others. It also provides another reason seriously to 
consider some of the incentive-changing policies listed above. The first two – 
economic penalties, or limiting measures currently used to externalise some 
costs of rearing children – could be used to counter the institutional unfairness: 
to internalise environmental and basic justice costs by transferring any 
increased collective burden to those choosing to parent.54  
Before turning to the hard choices associated with such policies, two points of 
clarification should be made. Firstly, the idea is not that only the costs associated 
with procreative choices should be internalised. This would be morally repellent 
                                                        
53 There are exceptions, e.g. rape victims, to whom these arguments do not apply. (For a fuller 
discussion, see Wissenburg (2010).) I acknowledge the practical difficulty of building this into 
policies, but set it aside for now. 
54 Casal and Williams (2004) p. 160-162. On internalising the costs of children more generally, 
see Rakowski (1993) p. 153-155. 
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given the environmental impact of consumption. Rather, I am assuming that a 
global institutional scheme could, less problematically, internalise the burdens 
resulting from non-essential emissions or resource-use choices. (E.g. through a 
carbon tax on such emissions or tradable personal carbon allowances.55) The 
unfairness would lie in exempting procreative decisions, given that they also 
impose environmental and basic justice costs. 
Moreover, it is inappropriate to assign full moral responsibility for 
procreative choice unless adequate choice-providing measures are in place. 
Where women have no access to contraceptives or no choice about sexual 
relations, even where parents have no other options save sacrificing central 
interests, the decision to parent is not a free choice. With low education and 
information levels, it is not adequately informed.  
Thus, two assumptions bear reiterating: that the internalising/incentive-
changing policies to be canvassed below are introduced within collective efforts 
to secure basic global justice and tackle climate change; and that they are not 
implemented where they would undermine other fundamental human interests 
circumstantially reliant on large families. From earlier sections, a further 
background requirement is that the opportunity to be a parent is protected.  
 
Hard options 3 and 4: institutional unfairness to children v. interference with 
the family 
Recall the four categories of population policy: negative financial or economic 
incentives; restriction of current externalising measures; positive incentives; 
cultural and educational campaigns. The first two could also be used to 
                                                        
55 On the latter, see e.g. Hyams (2009).  
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internalise environmental and basic justice costs, thus avoiding or limiting 
institutional unfairness across adults.  
Following earlier discussion, let us assume that incentive-changing policies 
need not force a tragic choice: basic injustice to children can be avoided without 
extreme interference with the family. This might be because only ‘soft’ policies 
are introduced, or even only positive financial incentives for restraint. (In this 
case, the problem of institutional unfairness across adults would remain.) 
However, it might be because, contingently, some negative financial incentives 
could be introduced or some existing externalising mechanisms revised without 
undermining children’s basic interests or entirely breaking up the family. (Again, 
such changes would have to be sufficient to change behaviour, although not 
necessarily fully to internalise environmental and basic justice costs. If they did 
not do so, some institutional unfairness across adults would remain.) Even so, 
introducing them requires balancing two morally hard options: institutional 
unfairness across children, and some interference with the family. 
If an institutional scheme decreases the resources available to larger families, 
some children will see their starting point made worse relative to those with 
fewer siblings.56 This applies to positive or negative economic and financial 
incentives. As with institutional unfairness across adults, this is not a problem 
for basic justice, so long as all children can live a decent life. However, it does 
conflict with the idea – convincing to many – that as co-members of some shared 
institutional structure we owe it to each other not to impose a collective scheme 
which increases inequality in starting points. Whoever should bear the 
                                                        
56 Wissenberg argues that any such policy would be objectionably unfair to adults who had not 
had all the children they wanted before it was introduced. (Wissenburg (1998).) I do not address 
this, since parallel concerns arise with any new liberty-limiting policy.  
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additional burdens of population growth (or slower population reduction), there 
is no morally convincing reason why they should be passed onto the ‘additional’ 
children, who did not ask to be born. Or onto their siblings.  
As discussed, policy modifications can limit the impact on children: rather 
than cut child-orientated services (for example, meals at school or state 
nurseries), they might be increased alongside increased taxes on parents. 
However, such changes would take some control and care-provision away from 
parents and so constitute interference with the family. This is at odds with the 
widespread assumption, including within the social justice debate, that the 
family is an institution worth protecting even at some cost. 
Moreover, it would be difficult for cultural and educational campaigns not to 
put ‘additional’ children at a relative disadvantage in terms of capacity for self-
respect, even if they could avoid undermining that capacity altogether. (This 
would require attaching significant stigma to having more than a certain number 
of children, without attaching any to being one of many siblings.) Thus, some 
institutional unfairness across children looks inevitable, if the apparently softest 
incentive-changing policy is implemented. In introducing incentive-changing 
population policies, morally hard choices must be made. 
 
Objections 
 
Before concluding, I must address two objections. Both concern my treatment of 
some incentive-changing policies as also internalising the costs of additional 
children, and so avoiding or limiting institutional unfairness across adults.  
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Children as public goods57 
A case has been made for internalising the environmental and basic justice costs 
of additional persons. However, within states, children are often considered a 
public good. They are future tax-payers, as well as doctors, nurses, police 
officers, teachers, train drivers, and sewage workers. Thus, arguably, the state 
should support parenting, by externalising its costs. Anything else, the argument 
goes, would not only be a violation of the principle of fairness (which requires 
individuals to contribute to collective schemes from which they receive a 
fundamental benefit) but also raise the spectre of undersupply.58 
This can be resisted.59 Recall that what is being incentivised is not having no 
children to populate the next generation, but having fewer of them. It is not clear 
that, overall, population growth within developed states is regarded as a good 
thing, or some reduction as a bad one. Numbers put pressures on resources 
within borders as well as across them (especially in terms of ecological goods or 
natural spaces). One might point out, moreover, that if citizens were really 
worried by decreasing birth rates purely because additional persons are an 
essential public good, they would happy to accept population growth through 
increased (skilled or child) immigration. 
Moreover, our starting point for this discussion is the moral imperative of 
maintaining circumstances within which it is possible to do basic global and 
intergenerational justice. Even if this were an interstate collective action 
problem, with replacement rate birth rates a public good within states and a 
                                                        
57 This objection is most likely in the context of precisely those developed or more advanced 
developing states where I have suggested that incentivising or internalising policies would first 
apply.  
58 E.g. George (1987), Olsaretti (2013).  
59 In fact, it is controversial whether principle of fairness arguments go through even if children 
are a public good. (E.g. Casal (1999) p. 365-8, Casal and Williams (2004) p. 156-159.) 
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public ‘bad’ taken globally,60 basic justice would require a collective effort to 
solve it by changing incentives. Thus, a global scheme would have to incentivise 
states to associate population growth (or even slower population reduction) 
with net costs. If current arrangements, such as the way pensions are funded, 
provide an incentive to maintain birth rates, the onus would be on states to 
amend those institutional structures.61  
 
An alternative approach to internalisation 
The second, related objection points out that there are two sets of internalisation 
policy to be considered, one of which I have neglected. This involves 
internalising the environmental costs of additional children in a narrow sense, by 
requiring parents to reduce emissions, or ecological footprint, to accommodate 
them. The idea would be that everyone has sufficient footprint to meet their 
central human interests (including to be a parent), but those choosing to have 
several children would have to decrease their impact proportionally in other 
ways?62  
Narrow internalisation has its attractions. A well-designed burden-sharing 
institutional scheme must, plausibly, make space for individual choice where 
compatible with basic justice. Intuitively, it should be up to a couple whether 
they to eat meat, travel more, or have more children. On the face of it, it is also an 
advantage that this option separates questions concerning the environmental 
burdens of population growth from more general arguments around the costs of 
                                                        
60 Casal (1999) p. 370-373.  
61 Robeyns (Unpublished-b). 
62  I assume that it is not legitimate to expect additional ecological space as a reward for not 
parenting at all. (Robeyns (Unpublished-a), contra Young (2001).) To demand to ‘trade away’ a 
central human interest is to re-open the whole question of what one is owed by basic justice. 
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children, including areas in which there might be a child- or, as already 
highlighted, a fairness-based case for externalisation.63 
Instead, I have focused on internalising environmental and basic justice costs 
in more general financial or economic terms, and so included internalisation 
within a broader discussion of incentive-changing policies. This is for several 
reasons.  
The costs of mitigating climate change and preserving natural resources are 
not the only ones to grow with human numbers. The costs of adaptation are also 
increased, and of basic justice for current generations. Thus, even if this were an 
appropriate way to internalise some environmental and basic justice costs, it 
would not cover them all. Moreover, technology is needed even for mitigation. 
Thus, while I have cautioned against treating technological investment as a 
collective ‘get out of jail free’ card, funding such technology may be an alternative 
to emissions cutting for some individuals (those for whom lifestyle changes are 
particularly difficult) within an effective overall approach. A narrow quota 
scheme could limit individual choice unnecessarily.  
I suspect that part of the appeal of narrow internalisation lies in worries about 
focusing on procreation rather than per capita emissions. This is 
understandable.64 However it is, as I hope I have clarified, misplaced in the 
context of this paper. To reiterate, incentive-changing/internalising population 
policies are canvassed as possible additions to other measures simply taken to be 
necessary. These include policies to reduce ecological footprint and internalise 
the environmental and basic justice costs of individual lifestyle choices, above 
                                                        
63 Child-orientated arguments are acknowledged even among those who reject fairness-based 
arguments for externalising other parenting costs, (E.g. Casal (1999) p. 374, Casal and Williams 
(2004) p. 163.) 
64 Cripps (Forthcoming). 
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the threshold for a decent life. The idea is to preserve, as far as possible, 
precisely the freedom of choice highlighted by the objection. If other 
internalising policies are combined with procreative ones, individuals and 
couples retain discretion on where to take the ‘hit’ needed for basic global and 
intergenerational justice.  
However, this is limited by both the current requirements of basic justice and 
the overall danger of leaving the circumstances of basic justice altogether. Any 
scope for ‘trading off’ procreative against other lifestyle or emissions choices 
must operate within these overall limits. (Thus, incentive-changing measures 
might be needed beyond internalisation.) 
We must also recall a key difference between procreative and other 
environmentally costly decisions. Absolute limits to lifestyle emissions and 
resource use can be collectively enforced, ultimately by prevention. However, 
enforcement-by-prevention of individual procreative limits would, given the only 
means currently available, violate fundamental human rights. Again, this puts 
more pressure on other policy options. 
It is worth stressing, however, that even if I were to focus instead on narrow 
internalisation, it would not change the conclusions of this paper. Any such 
scheme would force parallel hard or tragic choices to those identified earlier, and 
could prompt a more pressing version of them. 
One issue is the impact on a child’s opportunities if the family is limited to a 
smaller ecological footprint than the rest of society. This potential unfairness 
might seem less of a concern in this narrower context, at least so long as basic 
interests can be met, because one can have a very satisfying and fulfilled 
childhood – arguably a more rewarding one – with a lower carbon footprint than 
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one’s contemporaries, given caring and committed parents. However, the caveat 
is important: if parents cannot secure children’s basic interests within such 
limits, the scheme would be basically unjust. 
Moreover, it is unlikely that parents could accommodate the ecological 
footprints of additional children simply by making reductions themselves. If, as 
estimated, the average US woman increases emissions by 5.7 times her lifetime 
total by having a child (factoring in expectations of that child’s emissions, and the 
descendants he/she likely to have), cuttings one’s own future emissions to zero 
could not ‘fund’ even one additional child.65 Instead, the scheme would have to 
enable parents to ‘lock’ these children (and any of their descendants) into a 
lower emissions pattern into adulthood. This requires accepting institutional 
unfairness across children, or even basic injustice. 
If her footprint must stay much smaller (or, given the need to reduce overall 
emissions to zero by 2100,66 decrease much faster than the rest of those in her 
society), the individual’s basic interests could be threatened. Even if not, there 
are serious concerns about relative autonomy. While a lower-emissions life 
might well be as fulfilling as any other, for those brought up to it, the very fact of 
being committed to such a lifestyle forever, to a degree that her contemporaries 
are not, means this person faces a comparatively constrained set of options 
(particularly in terms of parenting). Compare her with the five year-old virtuoso 
signed up for life to a top orchestra: even if, as it happened, she rated her life as 
highly as many of her contemporaries do theirs, we would still feel that she had 
been treated wrongly. 
                                                        
65 Murtaugh and Schlax (2009) p. 14. 
66 IPCC (2014) p. 18. 
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Another level up, the suggestion would be that any fair global scheme must 
allow states the freedom to prioritise procreative choice over other emissions 
choices (within the limits of basic justice). I do not have scope to address this in 
detail, nor (within limits67) is it ruled out by anything I have said. However, I 
have four cautionary observations.  
Firstly, any moral pull of the argument depends on how the state decides to 
prioritise procreative freedom, in terms of legitimacy and representativeness. 
Secondly, there is an important difference between a single culture state, with a 
shared pronatalist conception of the good, and a multi-cultural one, in which the 
decision would amount to an unfair state subsidy for one conception of the good. 
Thirdly, the argument must work in reverse: if some states can make this choice, 
there is no prima facie reason why others should not opt collectively for higher 
per capita emissions and fewer children. Thus, questions would still have to be 
asked about the hard choices presented by incentive-changing population 
policies. 
Finally, again, this is not primarily a debate about internalisation and fairness. 
This paper is motivated by the need to avoid such population growth as would 
force our children or grandchildren’s generation to choose between basic global 
and intergenerational justice. There is only so far that states can go in making 
these emissions/procreative trade offs without coming up against that more 
tragic collective limit. 
 
 
                                                        
67 I have elsewhere laid some limitations on any global scheme: that it cannot permissibly, 
without further restrictions, simply tie burden quotas to fixed population levels.  Issues of 
institutional unfairness arise, as well as more fundamental concerns about incentivising the 
impermissible. (Cripps (Forthcoming).) 
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Conclusions 
 
This paper has reviewed the dangers facing any collective attempt to achieve 
basic global and intergenerational justice without undermining the potential for 
future generations to do the same. If the choice were between only some of these 
hazards it would already be tragic. Current generations would have to violate 
human rights, ask unbearable sacrifices of individuals, or fail to do basic justice 
to children. I have argued that it is not. However, hard choices remain. 
As well as immediately pursuing basic global justice, mitigating and adapting 
to climate change, and preserving natural resources, we must do one of two 
things. One is to gamble on technology to accommodate any further population 
growth. This also requires us to accept the institutional unfairness of a scheme 
which increases burdens on all persons as a result of free, informed choices 
made by only some of them. The alternative is also to introduce incentive-
changing population policies: those compatible with neither extreme 
interference with the family nor undermining children’s basic interests. This 
requires either unfairly limiting some children’s relative starting opportunities 
or interfering with the family (probably both). Moreover, such policies may not 
entirely be able to internalise the environmental and basic justice costs of 
procreative choices without basic injustice. Thus some institutional unfairness 
across adults would have to be accepted. (In practice, more might be accepted as 
a legitimate trade-off against institutional unfairness to children, insofar as 
compatible with adequate incentive-changing.)  
Given that the technological gamble is still a gamble, with desperately high 
stakes, and that these choices will only get harder (ultimately tragic) the longer 
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they are ignored, there seems to me to be a strong case for introducing incentive-
changing/internalisation population policies where choice-providing policies are 
already in place, and as soon as permissible after they are implemented 
elsewhere. This is especially so given that some trade-offs are already widely 
accepted between equality of opportunity for children and preservation of the 
family.68 
However, my aim has been to provide a roadmap for these difficult choices, 
not to make them. At the very least, I have provided a forceful reminder of the 
need to act urgently on basic global justice, climate change mitigation and 
adaptation, driven by emissions cuts and technology-funding by that same global 
elite. But I have tried also to show that we cannot neglect the possibility of 
addressing population directly without making a choice which is itself far from 
morally straightforward. As a generation, we are so placed that, whatever we do, 
it will involve acting against some moral presumption. As a global elite, we need 
to face up to the fact that this predicament is the result of our current and past 
combined actions and collective failures. This must be added to the already great 
moral tally against us.69 
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